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I. INTRODUCTION & ISSUE
Since December 2007, the United States has suffered through a
“Great Recession.”1 The stock market had plummeted more than 40%
from its peak as investors pulled their money from investments seeking

* Thank you to my family and friends, whose love, support and wisdom motivate and
inspire me everyday. Thank you to Edward Wicks (“Uncle Ed”) of Perkins Coie, LLP (Chicago,
Illinois) for your insight and guidance in putting this Note together. Thank you to the editorial
board and staff of the Florida Law Review for their assistance during the editing process of this
Note (especially Liz Bowers). Most importantly, thank you to Jennifer Gurland for dealing with
me and helping me stay sane while writing this Note.
1. Chris Isidore, The Great Recession, CNNMONEY.COM, Mar. 25, 2009,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/25/news/economy/depression_comparisons/index.htm. Although
the recession is officially over per gross domestic product reports from the National Bureau of
Economic Research, the economy by any other measure is still in recession with high
unemployment, imminent tax increases, fragile financial institutions, and a substantial risk of a
double-dip recession. See Michelle Singletary, For Many of Us, the Recession Lives on, WASH.
POST, Sept. 23, 2010, at A22, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/09/22/AR2010092205546.html; Nouriel Roubini & Michael Moran,
Avoid the Double Dip, FOREIGNPOLICY.COM, Nov. 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/
2010/10/11/avoid_the_double_dip?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full.
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safety under their mattresses.2 Companies and individuals have
struggled as bankruptcy filings increased to 1,306,315 nationwide
during the twelve-month period that ended on June 30, 2009—a 35%
increase since the end of June 2008.3 Americans’ investment funds have
not vanished, however, as funding sources wait on the sidelines ready to
reinvest in America’s future.4 According to the Federal Reserve,
Americans currently hold $8.85 trillion in cash, bank deposits, and
money market funds.5 This $8.85 trillion in liquid assets equals 74% of
the market value of all U.S. companies, the highest ratio since 1990.6
America’s economic recovery depends upon the quick and efficient
reinvestment of this sidelined money back into corporate America by
healthy corporations, individuals, and private equity funds.7 An
essential component of this recovery will be to encourage private equity
funds back into the market by providing incentives to buy either the
assets of or the entire bankrupt companies pursuant to § 363 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code (bankruptcy code).8 Section 363
authorizes debtors to “use, sell, or lease” their assets in “the ordinary
course of business” and upon notice to stakeholders and with court
approval, to do the same with those assets outside “the ordinary course
of business.”9 Section 363 also provides the statutory framework for the
sale of companies in bankruptcy.10 The sale of companies under § 363
of the bankruptcy code comes with many advantages to the purchaser,
including, among others, that such companies may leave bankruptcy
2. Tom Paradis & Sara Lepro, Stocks Fall on Belief Global Recession Is at Hand, THE
HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 24, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/10/24/stocks-head-forsharp-dec_n_137438.html.
3. Frank Taylor, Bankruptcy Filings Continue to Exceed 2008 Numbers Nationwide and
in Houston, EXAMINER.COM, Aug. 25, 2009, http://www.examiner.com/u-s-district-court-inhouston/bankruptcy-filings-continue-to-exceed-2008-numbers-nationwide-and-houston.
4. Eric Martin & Michael Tsang, Cash at 18-Year High Makes Stocks a Buy at Leuthold,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Dec. 29, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=email_en&refer=
&sid=aHYVLN8ZJtsc.
5. Id.; see also Alexandra Twin, Stocks: $2.9 Trillion on the Sideline, CNNMONEY.COM,
May 16, 2010, http://money.cnn.com/2010/05/16/markets/individual_investors/index.htm?hpt=
T2 (noting that individual investors have roughly $2.9 trillion in liquid investment readily
available for possible investment in assets of or the entirety of bankruptcy companies).
6. Martin & Tsang, supra note 4.
7. See Isidore, supra note 1.
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2006) (providing the procedure for the “[u]se, sale, or
lease of property” outside the “ordinary course of business” that has entered the bankruptcy
system); 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4) (2006) (allowing for the sale of the bankrupt company with
proceeds paid to the creditor of the bankrupt company).
9. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1).
10. See KEITH C. OWENS, FOLEY & LARDNER, ASSET PURCHASER’S GUIDE TO BANKRUPTCY
SALES 1–2 (2003), available at http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31Publications/FileUpload137/
1358/bankrupcy.623.2.pdf. In other instances, companies can also be sold through a Chapter 11
reorganization plan. Id. at 1; 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4).
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free and clear of any liens and are protected from fraudulent transfer
claims.11 In addition, break-up fees encourage private equity funds to
venture into the bankruptcy court system and acquire bankrupt
companies in whole or in part.12
A break-up fee “is an incentive payment to a prospective purchaser
with which a company fails to consummate a transaction.”13 A stalking
horse bidder is the “initial bidder with whom the debtor negotiates a
purchase agreement.”14 In simpler terms, a break-up fee is a termination
fee paid by the bankruptcy estate to the stalking horse bidder if “the
proposed sale [is] not consummated through no fault of the [bidder].”15
The break-up fee compensates the unsuccessful initial bidder through a
fee greater than the initial bidder’s actual due diligence expenses.16
Bankrupt companies often find it difficult to acquire a stalking horse
bidder because most bidders prefer to wait and simply bid over the
stalking horse.17 Stalking horse bidders rightly worry that their due
diligence, and the significant expense it entails, will simply be used by
either the bankruptcy estate to solicit higher offers or by subsequent
bidders to simply bid over a well researched and now entrenched
bidder.18 Many times, debtors lure stalking horse bidders, who are
hoping to buy the bankruptcy estate for pennies on the dollar, only to
use them for higher bids and to maximize the value of the assets.19
To encourage the stalking horse bidder to set a floor for the auction
price and terms of the transaction, a break-up fee is normally bargained
for in the purchase agreement.20 The stalking horse’s bid helps to assure
that the bankruptcy estate will be sold for the minimum acceptable
bid.21 The company, creditors, and trustee accepted the minimum
acceptable bid when they executed the initial purchase agreement,

11. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (“The trustee may sell property . . . free and clear of any interest in
such property . . . .”); In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d 283, 290 (3d Cir. 2003);
SHARON ALEXANDER, JONES DAY, BANKRUPTCY SALES: THE STALKING HORSE 1 (2003),
available at http://www.jonesday.com/pubs/pubs_detail.aspx?pubID=S2177; OWENS, supra
note 10, at 1–2.
12. ALEXANDER, supra note 11, at 2.
13. Official Comm. of Subordinated Bondholders v. Integrated Res., Inc. (In re Integrated
Res., Inc.), 147 B.R. 650, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
14. ALEXANDER, supra note 11, at 1.
15. OWENS, supra note 10, at 5; see also ALEXANDER, supra note 11, at 2.
16. See ALEXANDER, supra note 11, at 1.
17. Id. at 2.
18. Id. at 1.
19. John J. Jerome & Robert D. Drain, Bankruptcy Court Is Newest Arena for M&A
Action, N.Y.L.J., June 3, 1991, at 1, 8.
20. See ALEXANDER, supra note 11, at 2.
21. Joseph Samet, Use of Break-Up and Topping Fees in Corporate and Bankruptcy Asset
Sales, 906 PLI/COMM 1113, 1115–17 (2008).
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before proceeding with the auction.22 Many reasons exist for
prospective purchasers to require break-up fees (essentially a windfall to
the bidder) and for sellers to grant such fees (essentially a punitive cost
to the bankruptcy estate).23 However, break-up fees generate
controversy because many argue they detract from the value of the
estate by forcing other bidders to keep bids low to compensate for
break-up fees.24 Others argue break-up fees undercut the bankruptcy
code’s and the debtor’s goals to preserve as much value for the estate
and its creditors as possible.25 This heated debate leads courts to adopt
widely different standards and rules in governing the allowance of
break-up fees.26
In general, bankruptcy courts require that the debtor establish that a
tendered offer is the highest and best offer.27 However, there is no
federal statute or uniform common law standard for the allowance or
denial of break-up fees.28 Courts currently use three common standards
to determine whether to allow for payment of a break-up fee to a
stalking horse bidder in a § 363 asset sale.29 However, none of these
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1116.
Potential purchasers will often require a break-up or topping fee as
reimbursement or to compensate for: the continuing costs and risk that the
stalking horse will be outbid for the assets in question . . . legal and
professional fees and other expenses incurred obtaining financing
commitments, completing legal due diligence and negotiating and drafting
agreements with the seller; the time, energy and management resources
incurred as a result of the attempted acquisition; and the opportunity costs of
foregoing other business and investment opportunities while the bidding
process unfolds.
....
Sellers are willing to pay break-up and topping fees to encourage: initial
“stalking horse” offers when there are no competing bidders; bidding strategies
that avoid holding back competitive bids until later in the sale process; initial
bids that may be the offeror’s highest bid earlier in the sales process; a floor
price early in the bidding process; and momentum towards the consummation
of a sale.
Id.
24. Bruce A. Markell, Case Against Break-up Fees in Bankruptcy, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J.
349, 360 (1992).
25. Jerome & Drain, supra note 19, at 8.
26. See generally Samet, supra note 21, at 1117–25 (discussing the three different
standards by which courts will determine the allowance of a break-up fee).
27. In re Atlanta Packaging Prods., Inc., 99 B.R. 124, 131 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988) (“It is a
well-established principle of bankruptcy law that the objective of bankruptcy sales . . . is to
obtain the highest price or greatest overall benefit possible for the estate.”).
28. See Samet, supra note 21, at 1117–25.
29. WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE § 44:27 (3d ed.
West 2010); David M. Holliday, Right to Recover Break-Up Fee Arising from Sale of
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standards calls for detailed analysis of break-up fees or the effect of the
break-up fees on the stakeholders of the estate.30 The bankruptcy code is
designed to give uniform and detailed processes for corporations and
individuals within the bankruptcy system.31 The lack of a uniform
break-up fee standard encourages parties to forum shop,32 and it results
in a race to the bottom among companies, bidders, and courts vying for
bankrupt companies.33 Additionally, the lack of a uniform standard
leaves stalking horse bidders guessing whether bankruptcy judges will
approve or deny their break-up fees, producing erratic break-up fee
negotiations and no initial bid floor for many § 363 asset sales.34
In order to address the harm caused by the lack of a uniform
standard, this Note will argue that a new detailed, uniform statute be
integrated into the bankruptcy code. First, such a statute will fulfill the
ultimate goal of the bankruptcy code, to maximize for the estate the
highest bid for the property.35 Second, it will force bankruptcy courts to
employ consistent procedures to ensure that bidders know that their bids
will not be subject to unfair and unscrupulous practices.36 Third, the
statute will ensure that bankruptcy and district judges no longer issue
arbitrary37 and unpredictable decisions in complicated bankruptcy sale
cases.38 Lastly, it will discourage investment companies from forum
Bankruptcy Estate Property, 39 A.L.R. FED. 2D 219, § 2 (West 2010).
30. See Holliday, supra note 29, §§ 2–11 (analyzing the different jurisdictional tests
regarding break-up fees). Note, however, that the Business Judgment Rule only looks at whether
the management acted in the best interest of the estate, avoiding the detailed analysis of the fee.
The general administrative expense standard ignores the fees’ effect on the bankruptcy estate.
And the Best Interest of the Estate only requires a brief and bird’s eye view of whether the fee is
fiscally prudent for all stakeholders.
31. City of New York v. Quanta Res. Corp. (In re Quanta Res. Corp.), 739 F.2d 912, 915
(3d Cir. 1984) (“The objectives of federal bankruptcy law can be broadly stated: to provide for
an equitable settling of creditors’ accounts by usurping from the debtor his power to control the
distribution of his assets.”).
32. Scheinbart v. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp., 367 F. Supp 707, 710–11 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(“The federal courts . . . have little sympathy for forum shopping. ‘The federal courts comprise a
single system applying a single body of law, and no litigant has a right to have the interpretation
of one federal court rather than that of another determine his case.’” (quoting H. L. Green Co. v.
MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1962))).
33. See generally LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG
CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 9–24 (2005) (noting that bankruptcy courts
competing to encourage companies to file for bankruptcy in their jurisdiction have lowered their
standards to lure in these lucrative cases).
34. Markell, supra note 24, at 353.
35. Id. at 350 n.5 (“‘When the law requires a sale of property . . . to be made [at] public
auction . . . it is for the purpose of inviting competition among bidders that the highest price may
be obtained for what is sold[.]’” (quoting Porter v. Graves, 104 U.S. 171, 174 (1881))).
36. Id. at 359, 366.
37. See LOPUCKI, supra note 33, at 9–24.
38. See Markell, supra note 24, at 358–59, 375 (noting that bidders with knowledge that
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shopping39 and will create an efficient system for investments in
bankrupt companies, producing greater economic value and wealth.40
Part II of this Note analyzes the current precedent applied by
bankruptcy courts in determining the allowance of break-up fees.41 Part
II concludes that all three of the current break-up fee standards are
problematic and insufficient.42 Part III first analyzes the usefulness of
break-up fees and their growing popularity in § 363 transactions.43 Part
III then recommends that a new uniform standard (referred to as the
Best Interest of the Estate with Guidance Elements) be enacted into the
bankruptcy code and applied uniformly nationwide by bankruptcy
courts in determining the allowance of break-up fees.44 Part IV
concludes by highlighting the benefits of this new standard on § 363
transactions.45
II. CURRENT PRECEDENT FOR BREAK-UP FEES IN BANKRUPTCY
Currently, courts use three main standards to determine whether to
allow a break-up fee to be paid to a stalking horse bidder in a § 363
sale: the Business Judgment Rule, the general administrative expense
standard found in bankruptcy code § 503(b), and the Best Interest of the
Estate standard.46
A. Business Judgment Rule
The Business Judgment Rule is a non-bankruptcy doctrine that
courts normally apply in reviewing corporate transactions.47 “The
business judgment rule is a presumption that in making a business
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in
good faith and in honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interest of the company.”48 “The business judgment rule’s presumption
their deal will be reviewed by the courts will adjust their bids accordingly to compensate for the
risk of denial of the break-up fee).
39. See LOPUCKI, supra note 33, at 9–24.
40. See id.
41. See infra Part II.
42. Id.
43. See infra Part III.A.
44. See infra Part III.B.
45. See infra Part IV.
46. Holliday, supra note 29, §§ 2–11 (discussing the three main standards and other
standards, which are not addressed in this Note, but have been applied in rare instances).
47. Mark F. Hebbeln, The Economic Case for Judicial Deference to Break-Up Fee
Agreements in Bankruptcy, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 475, 475–76 (1997).
48. Official Comm. of Subordinated Bondholders v. Integrated Res., Inc. (In re Integrated
Res., Inc.), 147 B.R. 650, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,
872 (Del. 1985), overruled by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol62/iss5/8

6

Brown: Breaking Up and Making Out (Rich): Recommendations for Revision o

2010]

BREAKING UP AND MAKING OUT (RICH)

1469

shields corporate decision-makers and their decisions from judicial
second-guessing when the following elements are present: ‘(1) a
business decision, (2) disinterestedness, (3) due care, (4) good faith, and
(5) according to some courts and commentators, no abuse of discretion
or waste of corporate assets.’”49 In utilizing the Business Judgment
Rule, courts rarely interfere, question, or block a transaction barring
evidence of gross negligence, fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing.50 The
Second Circuit most often applies the Business Judgment Rule to
determine the allowance of break-up fees.51 In this context, the court
utilizes the Business Judgment Rule to determine whether the break-up
fee bolsters the bidding process and serves the best interest of the
seller’s shareholders.52 Unfortunately, this goal is rarely achieved.53
Courts began utilizing the Business Judgment Rule in § 363
bankruptcy asset sales to
increase the number of bidders in bankruptcy by
standardizing bidding practices in all business
acquisitions . . . [as] bidders for troubled companies do not
just operate in bankruptcy; indeed, their main focus and
market is the non-bankruptcy arena. Having different rules
in bankruptcy for what is essentially the same transaction
only injects confusion into the process, and this confusion
translates into lower bankruptcy dividends through reduced
bids (to compensate for the confusion) or reduced
competition (brought about by the confusion). By adopting
the rules of the main game, courts hope that more bidders
will consider bankruptcy debtors as acquisition candidates,
and will bid more confidently for those debtors.54
Few courts, though, have addressed whether the Business Judgment
Rule actually effectuates these goals in bankruptcy asset sales.55 In re
49. Id. (quoting DENNIS J. BLOCK, NANCY E. BARTON & STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE 12 (3d ed. 1991)).
50. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention
Doctrine 5 (UCLA, Sch. of Law and Econ. Res. Paper Series, Res. Paper No. 03-18), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=429260 (click the “One-Click Download” link; then select “Open” in
the pop-up window) (arguing that the Business Judgment Rule is merely a doctrine of abstention
that courts use as a justification to refuse to examine the board of directors’ decision).
51. See generally AMERICAN COLLEGE OF BANKRUPTCY’S CIRCUIT REVIEW AND BEST
PRACTICES REPORTS (2008) [hereinafter BEST PRACTICES REPORTS] (stating that the Business
Judgment Rule is not the official, binding standard for the Second Circuit since only the district
courts—and not the appellate court—has adopted the standard).
52. See Samet, supra note 21, at 1120–21 (construing In re Integrated Res., Inc., 147 B.R.
at 657).
53. Id.
54. Markell, supra note 24, at 359.
55. See Official Comm. of Subordinated Bondholders v. Integrated Res., Inc. (In re

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 5 [2010], Art. 8

1470

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

Integrated Resources, Inc.56 and In re 995 Fifth Avenue Associates,
L.P.57 lead the case law supporting utilization of the Business Judgment
Rule in break-up fee cases. The District Court for the Southern District
of New York in In re Integrated Resources, Inc. affirmed the
bankruptcy court’s decision to approve an $8.5 million break-up fee in
the dissolution of a holding company, valued at $565 million.58 The
district court laid out a three-part test to determine when the Business
Judgment Rule can be applied in a break-up fee case: “(1) is the
relationship of the parties who negotiated the break-up fee tainted by
self-dealing or manipulation;[59] (2) does the fee hamper, rather than
encourage, bidding;[60] (3) is the amount of the fee unreasonable relative
to the proposed purchase price?”61 In In re Integrated Resources, Inc.,
the district court answered no to each of these three questions, affirming
the bankruptcy court’s ruling and holding that break-up fees were
entitled to review under the Business Judgment Rule.62 The court
reasoned that the Business Judgment Rule “shields corporate decisionmakers and their decisions from judicial second-guessing” when the
five requirements of the Business Judgment Rule are present.63 The
court further reasoned that negotiation and agreement to a break-up fee
is simply a contractual negotiation.64
Integrated Res., Inc.), 147 B.R. 650, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
56. See id.
57. 96 B.R. 24, 28 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989).
58. 147 B.R. at 653–55. The holding company, which was “complicated and not easily
valued,” failed to secure an initial bidder without the enticement of a break-up fee and expense
reimbursements. Id. at 654.
59. Id. at 657. The court expounding upon part one of the test stated, “‘Nowhere does the
Code address this tension [between interested parties]. The courts balance these concerns on a
case by case basis.’” Id. at 658–59 (quoting In re Crowthers McCall Pattern Inc., 114 B.R. 877,
881 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
60. Id. at 657. The court expounding upon part two of the test stated:
The appropriate question is whether the break-up fee served any of three
possible useful functions: (1) to attract or retain a potentially successful bid, (2)
to establish a bid standard or minimum for other bidders to follow, or (3) to
attract additional bidders. Despite the confusing reference to a “stalking horse,”
the bankruptcy court correctly concluded that the Break-up Fee encouraged
bidding, because BT served all three of the above functions.
Id. at 661–62.
61. Id. at 657. The court expounding upon part three of the test stated, “A break-up fee
should constitute a fair and reasonable percentage of the proposed purchase price, and should be
reasonably related to the risk, effort, and expenses of the prospective purchaser.” Id. at 662.
62. Id. at 657–64. Even though the debtor’s managers discussed with the initial bidder the
prospects of retaining their executive positions after the buyout, the court still saw management
as disinterested. Id. at 658.
63. Id. at 656.
64. See id. at 663.
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The court in In re American West Airlines criticized the In re
Integrated Resources, Inc. decision for failing to “carefully scrutinize”
the necessity of the break-up fee or its helpfulness to the transaction.
The court also disapproved of the seemingly blind application of the
reasoning underlying the Business Judgment Rule in the nonbankruptcy context.65 The court, in its opinion, “went as far as to
recognize there exists a difference between acquisitions in bankruptcy
and outside of bankruptcy,”66 yet failed to show why the Business
Judgment Rule should apply to § 363(b) cases or even discuss the
precise procedural requirements of § 363(b).67 In essence, rather than
analyze whether the break-up fee was in the best interest of all the
interested parties (secured creditors, management, directors,
shareholders, etc.), helpful to the bidding process, or even appropriate
under § 363(b), the court instead treated the break-up fee as a simple
issue of corporate negotiation and contracting.68
In In re 995 Fifth Avenue Associates, L.P., a $500,000 break-up fee
for a stalking horse bidder’s initial $62 million bid was approved by the
bankruptcy court in the $76 million sale of a hotel in New York City.69
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York applied
the Business Judgment Rule in its decision because the rule had “vitality
by analogy” to break-up fee jurisprudence in the corporate context.70
The court further reasoned that the Business Judgment Rule applies to
both corporate and bankruptcy break-up fee jurisprudence because
managers and directors owe the same fiduciary duty to creditors in both
situations.71 Given the management’s stake in the outcome due to their
equity ownership, the court in In re 995 Fifth Avenue Associates, L.P.
failed to consider whether management, which had a stake in the
outcome because of their equity ownership, acted truly disinterested or
in the best interest of the creditors to whom they owed a fiduciary
duty.72
65. In re Am. W. Airlines, 166 B.R. 908, 911–12 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994) (holding also
that the Business Judgment Rule should never apply to break-up fee jurisprudence as the sale of
a business is always outside the normal course of business and requires greater judicial
analysis).
66. Id. at 911–12.
67. See id. (noting that the In re Integrated Resources, Inc. court failed to address whether
the debtor followed the correct post petition procedures under § 363(b), including gaining court
approval for a prospective purchase agreement); see also 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2006) (“The
trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of
business . . . .”).
68. See Markell, supra note 24, at 358.
69. 96 B.R. 24, 25 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989). The break-up fee was awarded in part because
of “[t]he spirited auction [which] was the direct result of a contract of sale by and between the
debtor and [the stalking horse bidder] . . . .” Id.
70. Id. at 28. The Business Judgment Rule would not have applied if the fee was too large
or chilled bidding. Id. at 28–29.
71. Id. at 28 n.4.
72. See id. at 28–29. The court failed to discuss whether the debtor company and its
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The failure by the court in In re 995 Fifth Avenue Associates, L.P.
and many other courts to adequately analyze the entire transaction and
weigh each stakeholder’s interests73 highlights not only why the
Business Judgment Rule is inappropriate in bankruptcy § 363(b) asset
sales but also the need for a uniform detailed standard.74 A debtor in
possession that is offering a portion of its estate for sale merely to entice
an initial bidder should have to prove that there is “some articulated
business justification” or “good business reason” for approving a breakup fee under § 363(b) that would protect the interests of all
stakeholders.75 Neither the court in In re Integrated Resources, Inc. nor
in In re 995 Fifth Avenue Associates, L.P. seemed concerned with
whether the debtor in possession carried these burdens of proof or
whether the break-up fee served the best interest of all stakeholders.76
The courts, in using the Business Judgment Rule, failed to examine the
necessity of break-up fees to the transaction or their usefulness to
encourage a competitive bidding process.77 Rather than carefully
examining the transactions under § 363(b) with respect to all
stakeholders, the courts deferred to the non-bankruptcy Business
Judgment Rule without meaningful § 363(b) analysis.78
The major difficulty with application of the Business Judgment Rule
in break-up fee jurisprudence is that it fails to take into account the
motivational differences between a debtor in possession (management
during bankruptcy proceedings) and a non-debtor (management in
normal times).79 The interests in bankruptcy differ from normal
corporate action as “[s]hareholders tend to seek the long-term
rehabilitation of the enterprise and to retain even those assets which
make only a marginal contribution to profitability. [While b]ondholders
. . . will often try to force the sale of profitable assets to generate cash
quickly to pay their claims.”80 Due to the adverse interests of equity
holders and debt holders, management faces a conflict of interest and
management fulfilled the six requirements of the Business Judgment Rule before applying the
Rule and merely assumed that since there had been scrutiny by a few stakeholders, the Rule was
applicable. Id.; see also Myron M. Sheinfeld & Judy Harris Pippitt, Fiduciary Duties of
Directors of a Corporation in the Vicinity of Insolvency and After Initiation of a Bankruptcy
Case, 60 BUS. LAW. 79, 88 (2004) (“Some courts hold that directors’ fiduciary duty shifts from
the stockholders to the creditors when a company becomes insolvent . . . .”).
73. See 96 B.R. at 28–29.
74. Samet, supra note 21, at 1121–22 (providing a thorough discussion of the rejection of
the Business Judgment Rule).
75. Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 772 F.2d 1063,
1070–71 (2d Cir. 1983).
76. Samet, supra note 21, at 1119–21; Markell, supra note 24, at 360 & n.53.
77. Samet, supra note 21, at 1119–22.
78. Id.
79. Markell, supra note 24, at 358.
80. Official Comm. of Subordinated Bondholders v. Integrated Res., Inc. (In re Integrated
Res., Inc.), 147 B.R. 650, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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thus fails the disinterested requirement of the Business Judgment
Rule.81 “In the non-bankruptcy takeover cases, management’s fiduciary
duties run primarily to the corporation’s shareholders . . . [while] the
management of a bankrupt company must ‘further the diverse interests
of the debtor, creditors and equity holders, alike.’”82 Therefore,
management must try to balance its fiduciary duty to the estate to seek
out the best offer it can for the relevant stakeholders against its
incentive to craft the purchase agreement to the personal, financial
benefit of equity stakeholders, including itself.83
Management’s conflict of interest and the diverse interests of the
many stakeholders in bankruptcy weaken any case for the application of
the Business Judgment Rule in § 363(b) sales.84 Stalking horse bidders
need certainty that their due diligence and bargained for break-up fees
will be upheld in court.85 Because company management in bankruptcy
has a conflict of interest, the non-bankruptcy Business Judgment Rule is
ineffective and should no longer be boot-strapped into bankruptcy.86
Strict application of the rule would cause companies to fail every time.87
Therefore, the Business Judgment Rule ought to be inapplicable to
break-up fees in bankruptcy cases.88 The complications of bankruptcy
require the courts to conduct a more thorough detailed analysis for
every case.89 Thus, a new uniform and detailed standard, with higher
scrutiny than the judicial deference to the Business Judgment Rule, is
needed to give guidance to courts, debtors, attorneys, and creditors in
the bankruptcy process.90
81. Seminaris v. Landa, 662 A.2d 1350, 1354 (Del. Ch. 1995) (“A director is interested if
he will be materially affected, either to his benefit or detriment, by a decision of the board, in a
manner not shared by the corporation and the stockholders.”).
82. In re Integrated Res., Inc., 147 B.R. at 658; Sheinfeld & Pippitt, supra note 72, at 88
(“Some courts hold that directors’ fiduciary duty shifts from the stockholders to the creditors
when a company becomes insolvent . . . .”).
83. NORTON, supra note 29, § 44:28.
84. In re Crowthers McCall Pattern, Inc., 114 B.R. 877, 881 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
85. Markell, supra note 24, at 365-66.
86. In re Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 166 B.R. 908, 911–12 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994); In re Hupp
Indus., Inc., 140 B.R. 191, 193–94 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
In the context of a nonbankruptcy asset sale, . . . break-up fees are
presumptively appropriate in view of the Business Judgment Rule . . . . In
the bankruptcy context, however, the Court must be necessarily wary of any
potential detrimental effect that an allowance of such a fee would visit upon
the debtor’s estate.
Id.
87. See In re Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 166 B.R. at 913; In re Hupp Indus., Inc., 140 B.R. at
195–96.
88. In re Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 166 B.R. at 912–13; In re Hupp Indus., Inc., 140 B.R. at
194.
89. In re Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 166 B.R. at 912–13.
90. Hebbeln, supra note 47, at 507–08 (“[C]ourts’ practice of invalidating break-up fee
agreements . . . provide[s] a disincentive to the initial bidder, a result that all would agree is not
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B. General Administrative Expense Jurisprudence of § 503(b)
In considering the allowance of break-up fees, the second standard
used by bankruptcy courts arises out of the administrative expense
jurisprudence of § 503(b) of the bankruptcy code.91 Administrative
expenses are debts of the estate which are paid after all secured debts
are fully repaid but before any unsecured debts are satisfied.92 There are
nine different circumstances in which courts, after notice and hearing to
all stakeholders, can declare an unpaid and unsecured debt an
administrative expense.93 Since administrative debts take priority over
all other unsecured debt, every debtor and stakeholder strives to
convince the courts to declare their debts an administrative expense to
help secure full repayment.94
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which is the only circuit that
applies a uniform standard for determining the allowance of break-up
fees, utilizes administrative expense jurisprudence to analyze break-up
fees.95 In In re O’Brien Environmental Energy, Inc., the Third Circuit
rejected both the Best Interest of the Estate standard and the Business
Judgment Rule as proper procedures for determining the allowance of
break-up fees.96 After discussion and analysis of both alternative
standards, the court held that “none . . . offers a compelling justification
for treating an application for break-up fees and expenses under
§ 503(b) differently from other applications for administrative expenses
under the same provision.”97 The court further rejected adopting the
detailed, nine factor analysis used by the lower bankruptcy court.98
Instead, the Third Circuit adopted only the lower court’s “implicit”
conclusion that the award of the break-up fee was unnecessary and
stated that all break-up fee analysis should stem directly and solely from
§ 503(b)(1)(a).99 Without conducting a thorough analysis, the court held
that stalking horse bidders were simply required to prove that the breakdesirable.”).
91. NORTON, supra note 29, § 44:27; see generally 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2006) (allowing
for administrative expenses which include the “actual, necessary costs and expenses of
preserving the estate”).
92. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (describing the nine different reasons courts can allow for payment
of administrative expenses); 11 U.S.C. § 506 (2006) (“[d]etermination of secured status”); 11
U.S.C. § 507 (2006) (“[p]riorities” of unsecured claims including administrative expenses); 11
U.S.C. § 726 (2006) (“[d]istribution of property of the estate” upon liquidation).
93. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b); 11 U.S.C. § 507.
94. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b); 11 U.S.C. § 507.
95. BEST PRACTICES REPORTS, supra note 51.
96. 181 F.3d 527, 535 (3d. Cir. 1999); NORTON, supra note 29, § 44:30.
97. In re O’Brien Envtl. Energy, Inc., 181 F.3d at 535.
98. Id. at 536 (“§ 503(b)(1)(A), which requires that an expense provide some benefit to
the debtor’s estate.”).
99. Id.
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up fees “were actually necessary to preserve the value of the estate.”100
In In re American Appliance, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of
New Jersey expanded upon In re O’ Brien Environmental Energy, Inc.
The court rejected a break-up fee by refusing to characterize the fee as
necessary to preserve the value of the estate if it advantaged a favored
purchaser or where a potential purchaser would bid, whether or not
break-up fees were offered.101
Although it was a valiant effort by the Third Circuit to give a new
(and arguably better) standard, the application of administrative expense
jurisprudence in break-up fee cases leaves stalking horse bidders still
guessing whether or not their break-up fee will be approved and has
initiated little change in practice.102 The § 503(b) standard, although
also preferred by the First, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits over the
Business Judgment Rule, exceedingly fails to give guidance through
administrative expense reimbursement precedent, without regard to the
relationship, similarities, or most importantly, the glaring differences
between administrative expenses and break-up fees.103 Break-up fees
and § 503(b) administrative expenses differ primarily in that
administrative expenses are supposed to be reimbursements or
repayments to legislatively preferred and designated creditors, while
break-up fees are often excessive damages paid to outside and noninvested bidders who lose a later auction or fail to consummate a
purchase agreement for some reason other than the fault of the stalking
horse bidder.104 The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Ohio, in In re Hupp Industries, Inc., explained that “[a] break-up fee
should not be authorized as an administrative expense where it is illdefined, not correlated to an actual transactional cost or expense
incurred by the negotiating bidder, and otherwise cannot be addressed
under a specific provision of § 503(b).”105
The first step Congress should take to reform break-up fee
jurisprudence and give concrete guidance for bidders is to recognize the
100. Id. at 535 (allowing break-up fees if it was proven that the presence of a break-up fee
promoted competitive bidding, thereby raising the estate’s auction price).
101. In re Amer. Appliance, 272 B.R. 587, 601 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2002).
102. David Peress & Stewart L. Cohen, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do, AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
Feb. 2001, at 25.
Since O’Brien, little has apparently changed in the Third Circuit. Buyers of
assets continue to routinely insist upon and receive various forms of bid
protections, including break-up fees. . . . Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the
Third Circuit’s admonition that break-up fees must be necessary “to preserve
the value of the estate,” it remains business as usual.
Id.
103. BEST PRACTICES REPORTS, supra note 51; Samet, supra note 21, at 1122–24.
104. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2006); ALEXANDER, supra note 11, at 2.
105. 140 B.R. 191, 196 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
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difference between compensatory administrative expenses and
excessive break-up fees.106 The problem with the § 503(b) standard is
that most courts do not recognize that treating break-up fees as
administrative expense reimbursements is similar to treating
compensatory and non-compensatory damages the same in a breach of
contract dispute.107 Break-up fees are penalties, above and beyond any
actual due diligence costs, paid by companies in bankruptcy who fail to
consummate a purchase agreement.108 The failure to distinguish
between compensatory and non-compensatory payments not only
violates basic contract law, which would apply to the asset purchase
agreement,109 but it also violates § 503(b) by providing liquidated
windfall damages to stalking horse bidders when the statute clearly only
allows for compensatory reimbursement under nine specific situations,
which all deal with expenses that are “actual” and “necessary” to
preserving the value of or properly dispensing the estate.110
C. Best Interest of Estate
As a third alternative, bankruptcy courts use the Best Interest of the
Estate standard in reviewing the allowance of break-up fees.111 The Best
Interest of the Estate standard was adopted by some bankruptcy courts
as a response to the inadequacy of the Business Judgment Rule.112 The
Best Interest Standard applies a broad analysis that aims to ensure the
highest sale price for the asset.113 The Best Interest Standard primarily
differs from the Business Judgment Rule in that the former takes into
account the economic impact upon all interested parties and
stakeholders, including creditors, thereby addressing the fiduciary duty
conflict faced by management in addressing divergent interests in
bankruptcy proceedings.114 The Best Interest Standard is most often
106. Compare infra Part III, with In re Beth Israel Hosp. Ass’n of Passaic, No. 06-16186,
2007 WL 2049881, at *12–14 (Bankr. D.N.J. July 12, 2007) (applying the same standard as
would be applied to any administrative reimbursement expense under § 503(b)).
107. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 187 (2002) (“[P]unitive damages, unlike
compensatory damages and injunctions, are generally not available for breach of
contract . . . .”); see In re Beth Israel Hosp. Ass’n of Passaic, 2007 WL 2049881 at *12–14
(rejecting argument that the break-up fee can be treated as liquidated punitive damages).
108. Official Comm. of Subordinated Bondholders v. Integrated Res., Inc. (In re
Integrated Res., Inc.), 147 B.R. 650, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
109. 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1979); NORTON, supra note 29; 22
AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 574 (2003) (“Punitive damages are generally not available under a
contract theory. Specifically, courts generally hold as a general rule that punitive damages are
not available as a remedy for breach of contract, without an underlying tort.”).
110. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2006).
111. NORTON, supra note 29, § 44:29.
112. Samet, supra note 21, at 1121–22.
113. Id. at 1115–17.
114. See id. at 1119–21.
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applied by bankruptcy courts in the Sixth and Ninth Circuits in
reviewing break-up fees.115
The Second Circuit formulated the Best Interest Standard in In re
Lionel Corp., in which the court considered whether to allow a break-up
fee in the dissolution of a toy train manufacturer.116 The court instructed
judges to consider “all salient factors” relating to the stakeholders
affected by the bankruptcy proceeding when evaluating break-up
fees.117 In re Lionel Corp. served as the founding basis for the Best
Interest Standard, as judges for the first time were instructed to look
beyond the transaction itself and its business sense and focus on the
break-up fees’ impact upon the estate and its stakeholder.118
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona applied the Best
Interest Standard during the complex and contentious bankruptcy
dissolution case of America West Airlines, which involved multiple
creditors, bidders, and stakeholders.119 The Chapter 11 debtor entered
into an interim sale procedure agreement that provided for a break-up
fee of $4 million to $8 million to the stalking horse bidder if the
purchase agreement failed to consummate.120 After careful analysis of
the entire potential transaction, including the economic impact on all
stakeholders, the court in In re America West Airlines, Inc. rejected the
break-up fee provision as not being in the “best interest [of the]
estate.”121 In denying the proposed break-up fee provision, the court
chose to apply the Best Interest Standard instead of the Business
Judgment Rule, stating that “the standard is not whether a break-up fee
is within the business judgment of the debtor, but whether the
transaction will further the diverse interests of the debtor, creditors and
equity holders, alike.”122 The court reasoned that “[t]he analysis
conducted by the Court [in break-up fee cases] must . . . include a
determination that all aspects of the transaction are in the best interests
of all concerned.”123
Although the Best Interest Standard is the best of the three existing
standards due to its requirement that the impact of the break-up fee be
evaluated in the light of all stakeholders, the standard needs specific
factors or elements to guide judges and attorneys in their evaluation of
115. BEST PRACTICES REPORTS, supra note 51.
116. Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063,
1065–66 (2d Cir. 1983).
117. Id. at 1071.
118. Samet, supra note 21, at 1121.
119. In re Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 166 B.R. 908, 912 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994).
120. Id. at 910.
121. Id. at 913.
122. Id. at 912 (quoting Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel
Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir.1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. Id.
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break-up fees.124 Although the In re Lionel Corp. court pioneered the
Best Interest Standard by instructing judges to consider the impact of
the break-up fee upon all stakeholders, it failed to provide judges with
definite factors to help guide judges in their evaluation.125 The court in
In re Hupp Industries, Inc. filled this void by being the first to clearly
articulate factors to be used as guidelines in break-up fee cases.126 The
court stated that seven factors must be considered when determining
“the propriety of allowing break-up fee[s].”127 Although these factors
were a good start to guide courts, they are not binding as would be
clearly defined elements in a new section of the bankruptcy code.128
III. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION FOR NEW UNIFORM
STANDARD TO EVALUATE BREAK-UP FEES IN BANKRUPTCY
§ 363 ASSET SALES
Before recommending a new uniform standard to evaluate break-up
fees in bankruptcy asset sales, I will analyze the usefulness of break-up
fees. For clarity, it should be kept in mind that break-up fees consist of
two elements: the portion that reimburses potential buyers for their
actual due diligence expenses and the portion paid to potential buyers
above their actual due diligence expenses.129 It is critical that courts
124.
125.
126.
127.

See In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1071.
See id.
In re Hupp Indus., Inc., 140 B.R. 191, 194 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
Id.
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)

Whether the fee requested correlates with a maximization of value to
the debtor’s estate;
Whether the underlying negotiated agreement is an arms-length
transaction between the debtor’s estate and the negotiating acquirer;
Whether the principal secured creditors and the official creditors
committee are supportive of the concession;
Whether the subject break-up fee constitutes a fair and reasonable
percentage of the proposed purchase price;
Whether the dollar amount of the break-up fee is so substantial that it
provides a “chilling effect” on other potential bidders;
The existence of available safeguards beneficial to the debtor’s estate;
Whether there exists a substantial adverse impact upon unsecured
creditors, where such creditors are in opposition to the break-up fee.

Id.
128. See 11 U.S.C. § 103 (2006); 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006) (“The court may issue any
order . . . that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”). A mandatory
“element” is defined as “[a] constituent part of a claim that must be proved for the claim to
succeed,” as opposed to a guidance “factor,” which is defined as “[a]n agent or cause that
contributes to a particular result.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 599, 630 (8th ed. 2004).
129. In re Tropea, 352 B.R. 766, 768 (Bankr. N.D.W. Va. 2006) (distinguishing between
actual expenses incurred by the stalking horse bidder and a punitive finder’s fee that was
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distinguish and rule separately on actual expense reimbursement
provisions and the portion of break-up fees that is in excess of actual
due diligence expenses.130 The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia made this distinction clear in In re Tropea
when it held that even though a stalking horse bidder was entitled to
“actual, necessary costs and expenses[,]” it was not entitled to a
“liquidated percentage fee.”131 The court properly separated the two
provisions,132 analyzing actual expenses under the actual and necessary
to preserving the estate § 503(b)(1) standard of the bankruptcy code
while analyzing the excess portion of the break-up fee under a stricter
(yet not fully defined) standard.133 Because break-up fee provisions are
liquidated damages clauses,134 they should be analyzed under a stricter
standard before courts allow an initial bidder in a bankruptcy § 363(b)
sale to receive a windfall.135 Conversely, the bankruptcy estate’s actual
due diligence expenses should be held to the more relaxed actual and
necessary for costs preserving the estate standard.136
A. Are Break-Up Fees Necessary or Useful?
Two key questions must be answered in analyzing whether break-up
fees are necessary or useful in § 363(b) asset sales. First, who should
bear the cost of investigating the potential subject asset of an auction?137
Second, do initial bidders need inducement or incentive to place bids for
companies in bankruptcy?138 These questions focus on a common
scenario: a debtor, with its conflicted fiduciary interests, agrees to a
break-up fee with a potential bidder; its creditors and stakeholders are
characterized as a break-up fee).
130. In re Hupp Indus., Inc., 140 B.R. 191, 194 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
It is observed that some courts have considered the allowance of break-up
fees in various forms. One court considered such fees framed solely in the
form of expense reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses relating to costs
incurred during a due diligence period, while another court allowed
reasonable break-up fees wholly independent of the transaction costs.
Id. (citing Official Comm. of Subordinated Bondholders v. Integrated Res., Inc. (In re Integrated
Res., Inc.), 135 B.R. 746, 752–53 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re 995 Fifth Ave. Assocs., 96 B.R.
24, 29 n.6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989)).
131. In re Tropea, 352 B.R. at 768.
132. See In re Hupp Indus., Inc., 140 B.R. at 194.
133. In re Tropea, 352 B.R. at 768–69.
134. TINA L. STARK, NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING CONTRACT BOILERPLATE § 9.03(3)
(2003).
135. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (2006); In re Beth Israel Hosp. Ass’n of Passaic, No.
06-16186, 2007 WL 2049881, at *15–16 (Bankr. D.N.J. July 12, 2007).
136. See supra note 135.
137. In re S.N.A. Nut Co., 186 B.R. 98, 106 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995).
138. See id.
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forced to pay for the break-up fee without a fair say in the matter; and
the initial bidder receives all the benefit with little or no risk.139
On one hand, break-up fees encourage competitive bidding by
compensating initial bidders for their risk, due diligence expense, time
and energy, and the lost opportunity cost of not focusing on or acquiring
other potential takeover targets.140 Initial bidders argue that they need
the encouragement and protection of break-up fees since they expect
their bids to be shopped around by the bankrupt company to achieve the
highest price for the asset.141 “The last thing a bidder wants is to have its
offer ‘shopped’ or used as a stalking horse for other bids.”142 Yet this
stalking horse bid is exactly what the bankruptcy estate wants and needs
to fulfill fiduciary duties: an initial competitive bid not only to set the
floor of the auction but also to solicit other potential suitors in order to
get the highest auction price.143
On the other hand, break-up fees are many times excessive, give
little benefit to the final value of the asset, and discourage later bidders
in the auction.144 Initial bidders also need little incentive to offer early
bids, as they would most likely bid anyway, considering the strong
benefits and protection that bankruptcy provides for buyers of assets.145
Initial bidders argue that they need this compensation in order to justify
researching and bidding for risky bankrupt companies.146 However, this
argument pales against the many advantages the bankruptcy code
provides to buyers of assets in bankruptcy.147 In fact, many companies
are placed into bankruptcy at the request of bidders in order to secure
these substantial benefits found in no other context.148
Break-up fees also disadvantage later bidders by increasing the
amount that later bidders must offer in order to place a competitive
bid.149 For “if [the sum of] the bid costs [including the break-up fee] and
139. Id. at 106 (noting that creditors and other stakeholders end up paying for the break-up
fee in the form of fewer assets available for distribution since a break-up fee must be paid out
from the final auction price).
140. Samet, supra note 21, at 1115.
141. Markell, supra note 24, at 357.
142. Id. at 365.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 369.
145. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2006); Markell, supra note 24, at 374.
146. See Markell, supra note 24, at 374–75, 380; ALEXANDER, supra note 11, at 1.
147. Markell, supra note 24, at 374–75.
148. See id. at 374. Bidders in negotiating asset sale agreements will sometimes require the
target to file for bankruptcy protection as a condition of the agreement. See id. (construing In re
Financial News Network, Inc. 126 B.R. 152, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)). The bankruptcy code also
encourages this practice by allowing pre-petition solicitations of votes to approve a Chapter 11
plan, which are binding post-petition, assuming compliance with applicable disclosure laws and
regulations. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (2006).
149. See Markell, supra note 24, at 362–63.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol62/iss5/8

18

Brown: Breaking Up and Making Out (Rich): Recommendations for Revision o

2010]

BREAKING UP AND MAKING OUT (RICH)

1481

the bid price exceed the estimated value of the asset, then the bidder
will not proceed,” forcing out many potential bidders from the
auction.150 Break-up fees can also fund research into competitor’s nonpublic records.151 In this sense, bidders not only get a free look at their
competitor’s books, but bidders may also receive windfall compensation
for doing so.152
The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois in In re
S.N.A. Nut Company recognized the quandary of the two questions
noted above and succinctly stated,
The goal of a bankruptcy auction . . . is to maximize the
return to the estate. The cost of bidding should be borne by
those who are best able to bear them—the bidders who
have voluntarily entered the bidding process, and who are
bidding for a company with title free and clear of liens and
with all the advantages provided by the Bankruptcy
Code.153
Although the debate over the usefulness of break-up fees continues,
courts have implicitly accepted break-up fees without much analysis,154
as being a normal and necessary part of corporate and bankruptcy asset
sales.155 Courts now approve break-up fees with greater frequency,
leaving more creditors and stakeholders holding the break-up fee bill.156
Bruce Markell was correct in concluding that the “trend [of courts]
towards adoption and approval of these [break-up fees]” is illadvised.157 The case law makes it appear that break-up fees are not

150. Id. at 362. In simple math, if a company is willing to bid as high as $10 for a
company, but there is a $2 break-up fee provision, economics dictate that the company will
leave the auction at $8, thereby limiting bidders and reducing the final auction value of the asset.
Id.
151. Id. at 361 n.57 (“[I]f the potential acquirer is a competitor of the target. . . . there are
potential concerns regarding antitrust violations or unfair trade practices—the bidder may mount
a sham bid simply to acquire non-public information regarding the debtor.”).
152. Id. at 361–62.
153. In re S.N.A. Nut Co., 186 B.R. 98, 106 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (rejecting the
application of the Business Judgment Rule and instead applying the Best Interest Standard).
154. See supra Part II.
155. ALEXANDER, supra note 11, at 1–2.
156. Markell, supra note 24, at 351.
157. Id. at 351, 369.
[T]he maximum breakup fee that a court should approve is one that offers
to repay a bidder’s direct costs of preparing and making its bid. Any additional
fee will overcompensate the bidder for its risk in bidding; it pays the bidder for
bidding when it would have bid without the fee. . . . It is wasteful, and should
be discouraged. The actual court reaction to such requests for breakup fees,
however, has not followed this course.
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going away anytime soon.158 Therefore, a new uniform standard must
be introduced to help make the process fair, guided, and balanced.159
B. Recommendation for New Uniform Standard—Best Interest
of the Estate with Guidance Elements
To remedy the absence of a uniform, detailed break-up fee standard,
this Note argues that the following elements should be incorporated into
§ 363 of the bankruptcy code to govern the allowance of break-up fee
provisions.160 These elements should be incorporated as guidance
against the backdrop of the existing Best Interest of the Estate Rule161
that already instructs judges to take into account the economic impact
upon all stakeholders while analyzing the fiduciary duty conflict faced
by management.162
The first guidance element in analyzing the justification for a breakup fee is whether the stalking horse bidder will share its due diligence
with later bidders.163 Stalking horse bidders primarily require break-up
fees to keep later bidders from using their initial bids and due diligence
as a platform to make subsequent bids.164 In an effort to maximize
information among all bidders and reduce duplication of due diligence,
stalking horse bidders should be encouraged to share their due
diligence. While the sharing of due diligence cannot eliminate all
duplication,165 it provides courts with a solid justification to grant the
stalking horse bidder a break-up fee in compensation for lowering the
total cost of due diligence among all bidders.166 In satisfying this first
element, stalking horse bidders should offer evidence to the court that
they will share their due diligence and that such sharing will encourage
other bidders.167
Id. at 369.
158. Id. at 351, 369.
159. See id.
160. See LOPUCKI, supra note 33, at 19–20 (noting that many bankruptcy judges desire to
attract the biggest cases to their courtroom in an effort to gain notoriety, respect in the legal and
business community, and most importantly ensure they are elected to a second term, sometimes
at the expense of nationwide uniform decision-making).
161. Samet, supra note 21, at 1121–22. Defining a mandatory “element” as “[a] constituent
part of a claim that must be proved for the claim to succeed,” as opposed to a guidance “factor”
defined as “[a]n agent or cause that contributes to a particular result.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 559, 630 (8th ed. 2004).
162. See supra note 161.
163. Markell, supra note 24, at 379.
164. Although later bidders will rarely see the stalking horse’s due diligence, they can
easily bid incrementally above the initial bid knowing that the stalking horse bidder would not
place an irrational bid. Id. at 377–78.
165. Id. at 361 (noting that “[a]s useful as such information is, the bidder must spend some
of its funds to obtain it” and verify that the information is correct and not misleading).
166. Id. at 370.
167. Evidenced in the form of subsequent bidders who vouch that they would not have bid
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The second guidance element in analyzing the justification for a
break-up fee should be whether the break-up fee will hamper an auction
process or discourage further bidding.168 Inflated break-up fees may
hinder competing bids by making them too expensive.169 If the court
finds that the break-up fee is a reason why later bidders might likely
choose not to bid and raise the value of the asset, it should view with
great suspicion the break-up fee in relation to the best interests of the
estate.170 It can be difficult for a court to discern the real reason why a
potential later bidder might choose not to bid.171
In such cases, courts should be entitled to require that a competitive
auction occur in order for a break-up fee to be awarded.172 Generally, no
reasons exist to pay a break-up fee if the auction fails to produce
multiple bidders or the purchase agreement fails for reasons other than a
subsequent bidder outbidding the stalking horse bidder for the asset.173
On the other hand, a successful competitive auction that “will serve to
maximize revenue[s]” among well-researched and informed bidders
gives support for the reasonableness of the break-up fee if the initial
bidder is fairly outbid.174
The third guidance element supporting a stalking horse bidder’s
claim to a break-up fee should be whether the underlying negotiated
agreement is an arms-length transaction between the debtor’s estate and
the negotiating bidder.175 Courts should examine whether the initial
bidder held any leverage in the asset purchase agreement negotiation
and/or forced the debtor into the break-up fee provision.176 Courts
should possibly consider whether the initial bidder held any undue
leverage by applying the fair dealing factors of the entire fairness
standard which is commonly used in analyzing non-bankruptcy
corporate transactions.177 By evaluating “[how] the transaction was
but for the initial bid and the information it supplied them. See id. at 370, 379.
168. See Official Comm. of Subordinated Bondholders v. Integrated Res., Inc. (In re
Integrated Res., Inc.), 147 B.R. 650, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Hupp Indus. Inc., 140 B.R. 191,
194 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
169. Markell, supra note 24, at 362 (“This is shorthand for a traditional cost/benefit
analysis: if [the sum of] the bid costs and the bid price exceed the estimated value of the asset,
then the bidder will not proceed.”).
170. See id. at 366.
171. See id. at 360.
172. Id. at 367–68.
173. Id. at 368.
174. Id. at 367–68.
175. See In re Hupp Indus. Inc., 140 B.R. 191, 194 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
176. Id.
177. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (“[F]air
dealing . . . embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated,
structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the
stockholders were obtained.”).
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timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the
directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders
were obtained,” the court will more thoroughly understand the
bargaining powers that each party had at the negotiating table.178
Ultimately, a competitive bidding process with many potential initial
bidders indicates that the debtor had many suitors with which it could
negotiate favorable terms.179 On the contrary, an asset sale with only
one or two potential initial bidders would render a break-up fee suspect
of unfair leverage in the asset purchase agreement negotiation.180
The fourth guidance element should be whether the stalking horse
bidder was an insider or fiduciary of the debtor.181 The court should
consistently deny a break-up fee to insiders or fiduciaries of the debtor
unless the bidder can prove that the fee in no way stymied the auction
process and was critical to the initial purchase agreement.182 If the
debtor can prove these elements, the court should still assume that the
insider or fiduciary had an inside track on due diligence and consider
lowering the amount of the break-up fee to reflect this initial
competitive advantage against other bidders.183 This element would
prevent fiduciaries from bartering away a piece of the company in
which other interested parties have an interest and then claiming an
excessive break-up fee.184
The fifth guidance element should be whether the debtor company is
still run by old (pre-bankruptcy) management.185 If so, then the
company should have to prove “some articulated business justification”
or “good business reason” with independent financial analysis to keep
the pre-bankruptcy management.186 Since no markets exists for courts to
easily analyze the value of bankrupt assets, bankruptcy courts are
deprived of such information and must rely on often self-serving
statements of management as to its efforts to sell the asset. 187 In order
to overcome the taint of self-interestedness, management must prove
178. Id.
179. See In re Hupp Indus. Inc., 140 B.R. 191, 194 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
180. Id.
181. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (2006); In re Biderman Indus., Inc., 203 B.R. 547, 551–54
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (denying a break-up fee to fiduciary insider under the Business
Judgment Rule for lacking disinterestedness).
182. In re Biderman Indus., Inc., 203 B.R. at 551–54.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 553–54; Sheinfeld & Pippitt, supra note 72, at 88 (“Some courts hold that
directors’ fiduciary duty shifts from the stockholders to the creditors when a company becomes
insolvent . . . .”).
185. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (2006); Samet, supra note 21, at 1121–22 (thorough discussion
of the rejection of the Business Judgment Rule).
186. Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 772 F.2d 1063,
1070–71 (2d Cir. 1983).
187. Markell, supra note 24, at 373.
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this “good business reason” rather than simply presenting mere selfserving statements.188 Courts additionally could question whether
management used “good business reason[ing]” by applying the fair
price factors of the entire fairness standard.189 By evaluating the
“economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger,
including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future
prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent
value of a company’s stock,” the court could better evaluate whether
management has utilized “good business reasoning.”190
The sixth guidance element supporting a stalking horse bidder’s
claim to a break-up fee should require evidence that a stalking horse
bidder would refrain from bidding if there was no break-up fee.191 If
another bidder can prove to the court that they would have bid without
the incentive of a break-up fee, then the benefit of a break-up fee is
greatly diminished.192 On the other hand, if the debtor can prove that no
bidders would bid without the protection of a break-up fee, then the
break-up fee becomes a very useful tool to auction off the estate to the
highest bidder.193 Such proof may be scarce because, as one
commentator put it, “[a]ll a court typically has before it when deciding
to approve a breakup fee is the [stalking horse] bidder’s self-serving
[and post-auction] statement[s] that it [would not have gone] forward in
the absence of a fee.”194 Courts generally have no sure way to fully test
this type of statement.195
In considering whether the break-up fee discourages an auction
process and precludes further bidding, the court should also examine
whether the break-up fee constitutes a fair and reasonable percentage of
the proposed purchase price.196 Courts tend to approve break-up fees
totaling between 1% and 4% of the total purchase price, but the higher
the percentage, the more scrutiny the court should apply in examining
whether the break-up fee is within the Best Interest of the Estate.197
188. See In re Lionel Corp., 772 F.2d at 1070–71; Markell, supra note 24, at 373.
189. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (“[F]air price . . . relates to
the economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger, including all relevant factors:
assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic
or inherent value of a company’s stock.”).
190. Id.
191. See Markell, supra note 24, at 360.
192. See id.
193. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
194. Markell, supra note 24, at 360.
195. Id.
196. In re Hupp Indus. Inc., 140 B.R. 191, 194 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
197. In re Tampa Beef Packing, Inc., 312 B.R. 192, 194–95 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2004)
(noting that in unusual or very large transactions the norm is 1% to 2% of the total purchase
price); cf. Debra I. Grassgreen et al., Who Wins in the Race to Get Break-up Fees Approved?
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2003, at 52. (noting that fees equaling 2% to 3% of the proposed sale
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Best Interest of the Estate Rule, along with the aforementioned
elements, should be incorporated by Congress into the bankruptcy code
to help ensure that bankruptcy assets are sold for the highest possible
bid198 and that bankruptcy courts will apply consistent standards to
break-up fees so that bidders can be more confident that their bids will
not be subject to unfair and unscrupulous practices.199 The new code
provision will also help to avoid arbitrary200 and unpredictable decisions
by judges in complicated bankruptcy sale cases that mainly result from
the current break-up fee jurisprudence.201 The new code provision
would discourage stalking horse bidders from forum shopping since the
same rules would be effective in all districts.202 Finally, and most
importantly, the new code provision will create a more efficient system
of investments in bankrupt companies facilitating the free flow of
trillions of dollars currently waiting on the sidelines, in turn producing
greater value, wealth, and long-term strength in the economy while
preventing unworthy, initial stalking horse bidders from breaking-up
and making out (rich).203

price will generally be approved).
198. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
199. Id. at 366.
200. See LOPUCKI, supra note 33, at 19–20 (noting that many bankruptcy judges desire
attracting the biggest cases to their courtroom in an effort to gain notoriety, respect in the legal
and business community and most importantly ensure they are elected to a second term).
201. See Markell, supra note 24, at 375 (noting that bidders with knowledge that their deal
will be reviewed by the courts will adjust their bids accordingly to compensate for the additional
risk associated with the non-uniform rules and possible rejection of the break-up fee).
202. See generally LOPUCKI, supra note 33 (noting that there is flexibility in the
bankruptcy code exercised by bankruptcy judges in an effort to attract the biggest cases (and
biggest fees) to their courtrooms).
203. See Isidore, supra note 1; LOPUCKI, supra note 33, at 19–20; Martin & Tsang, supra
note 4 (noting that large-scale cash on the sidelines is a buy indication for equities in the nearterm).
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